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joined the Chinese South Sea Fleet in
January 1999, and a Sovremenny DDG
entered the Chinese order of battle in
early 2000). Second, Kim does not treat
the Republic of Korea Navy as a major
regional actor, leaving it conspicuously
absent from his chapters on strategy and
concerns about cooperative maritime
security. This is a significant omission.
Korea is a growing naval power with
extensive regional concerns, and it is pos-
sibly the nation most likely to find itself
in armed conflict across its borders.
These gaps aside, this is a book worth
having in a library on modern Asia. The
extensive selected bibliography adds
value to this work as a resource on
Northeast Asian politico-military mat-
ters. It obviously should be required
reading for those involved in Northeast
Asian regional maritime issues, and it
would also be of interest to anyone seek-
ing to understand the unique problems





Weintraub, Stanley. MacArthur’s War: Korea and
the Undoing of an American Hero. New York: Free
Press, 2000. 385pp. $27.50
No figure of the Korean War looms quite
so large as General of the Army Douglas
MacArthur, simultaneously brilliant, ar-
rogant, inscrutable, successful, and
fallen—all the elements of a Greek tragedy.
His military career, spanning the major
portion of the twentieth century, also ren-
ders him appealing as a symbol of broader
themes of that war and of American soci-
ety. So we come to Stanley Weintraub’s
MacArthur’s War, advertised on its dust
jacket as a “fascinating, well rendered
history of the general who refuses to fade
away,” a book based on “extensive re-
search in primary and secondary sources
and laced with colorful anecdotes.”
Unfortunately, the book is none of those
things but rather a facile, cobbled-together
mishmash of principally secondary
sources, laced with myriad errors of chro-
nology, fact, and interpretation—all
poorly documented. When reading this
book, one feels not unlike Vice Admiral
James H. Doyle after reading a draft of a
Korean War history sent to him in the late
1950s: “Your versions of the Inchon as-
sault and Hungnam redeployment contain
so many errors and distortions of fact and
of emphasis that I am unable to assist you
with my comment.” However, I would
like to make note of a baker’s dozen of
errors to provide specific evidence for my
general assertions.
The author states on page 107 that the
amphibious commander, Rear Admiral
Doyle, “had been Richmond Kelly
Turner’s operations officer in the final
months of World War II.” In fact, Doyle
served on Turner’s staff from August
1942 to March 1943; in the final months
of the war, Doyle was commanding the
cruiser Pasadena. These are not obscure
facts but can readily be found both in
George Dyer’s biography of Turner, The
Amphibians Came to Conquer, and in
Doyle’s official biography at the Naval
Historical Center.
Weintraub writes that Rear Admiral
Arleigh Burke explained to MacArthur
the need to sail early for Inchon because
of the typhoon season. “Although nearly
a month remained before departure, the
ship movement orders were issued im-
mediately,” which would suggest that
the conversation took place around 15
August. Burke was good, but probably
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not that good. He did not arrive in Japan
until 3 September 1950, twelve days be-
fore the operation. He did have such a
conversation with MacArthur, but only
several days before the scheduled sail-
ing, and with respect specifically to
Typhoon Kezia. This is all described in
Burke’s oral history, which is available
at the U.S. Naval Institute, and which ap-
parently Weintraub consulted.
We also learn that during World War II
the 1st Marine Division “had stormed the
beaches of Guadalcanal, New Guinea,
New Britain, Peleliu, and Okinawa.” The
1st Marine Division did not assault any
beach or conduct any operation in New
Guinea, although several other smaller
Marine units did. That was an Army show.
Weintraub contends that Inchon was
largely possible only because a World
War II study conducted for the Joint
Chiefs of Staff assessed Inchon as a possi-
ble landing site: “Without such detailed
earlier data, MacArthur could not have
carried out Chromite on such a short
fuse.” None of the principals involved
have, to my knowledge, made reference
to such a study. Poor institutional mem-
ory is not unusual. Little was known
about Inchon in 1950, but someone re-
called that Vice Admiral Thomas
Kinkaid, commander of the Seventh
Fleet, had accepted the Japanese surren-
der there in 1945. The U.S. Army had
run the port for a time. At Doyle’s insis-
tence, a “frantic search turned up an
Army warrant officer, W. R. Miller, who
had lived on Wolmi Do and operated
Transportation Corps boats over Inchon
Harbor. . . . [He] forthwith joined Admi-
ral Doyle’s staff.” (The reader can refer to
Robert Debs Heinl, Jr.’s Victory at High
Tide [Lippincott, 1968.])
In chapter 8, the author quotes from
James Alexander’s Inchon to Wonsan:
“On the destroyer Borland, accompany-
ing the escort carrier Badoeng Strait as
the Inchon flotilla moved north[,] . . .
Marine and FEAF [Far East Air Force] pi-
lots could be picked up on ship’s radio.”
There has never been a U.S. Navy de-
stroyer Borland, which one can confirm
in the Dictionary of American Naval
Fighting Ships, volume 1. Better yet, sim-
ply read the publisher’s description of Al-
exander’s book: “Alexander has created a
fictional destroyer, the USS John J.
Borland, and he records through this sin-
gle ship the actual experiences of a num-
ber of real destroyers through their logs
and diaries.”
At one point, Weintraub has Lewis B.
Puller commanding the 1st Marines,
which he did. Later in the book, how-
ever, the author has Puller commanding
the 5th Marines; this would have un-
doubtedly surprised Ray Murray, who
actually did command the 5th Marines.
Also, Homer Litzenberg is given the 11th
Marines—he commanded the 7th
Marines—and Ray David, who won the
Congressional Medal of Honor at
Chosin, will be pleased to learn that, ac-
cording to Weintraub, he became a Ma-
rine Corps commandant.
During the delay in landing X Corps be-
cause of land mines, Weintraub writes,
MacArthur “insist[ed] that the amphibi-
ous operations proceed but with the 7th
Division now to make an alternative as-
sault at Iwon.” That decision was mutu-
ally made by the X Corps Commanding
General (CG), Major General Edward Al-
mond, with Doyle and Struble, aboard
the USS Mount McKinley on 24 October
1950. The reader can refer to the Naval
Historical Center’s Operational Archives.
Weintraub also tells us on page 169 that
“for Wonsan, Admiral Struble hastily as-
sembled a twenty-one minesweeper
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flotilla, including nine ships from the im-
pounded Imperial Japanese Navy.” This
short sentence contains three errors of
fact. Struble, as Commander, Joint Task
Force, did not assemble the minesweeping
force. Captain Richard Spofford, com-
mander of Mine Squadron 3, in fact re-
ported to Vice Admiral Turner Joy as
Commander of Naval Forces Far East. Joy
intentionally kept control of the “sweeps.”
Burke requested the Japanese minesweep-
ers on 2 October. These were not im-
pounded Imperial Japanese Navy ships
but Japanese Maritime Safety Agency
(JMSA) vessels that had been actively
sweeping the Inland Sea since the end of
World War II. On 6 October, the JMSA
quietly authorized twenty minesweepers,
four patrol boats (to act as mother ships),
and one other vessel, to deal with mag-
netic mines. Some went to Korea’s west
coast, and ten or twelve went to Wonsan,
as stated in Burke’s oral history.
It is in its discussion of Hungnam, how-
ever, that the book really shines. On page
287, Weintraub blithely writes that “stow-
age diagrams for troops and equipment
were ignored daily as troops filled whatever
ships were available.” This statement implies
a willy-nilly process of outloading at
Hungnam. Nothing could be farther from
the truth. Burke began to hold shipping in
Japan in mid-November; Doyle issued Op-
eration Order 19-50 on 29 November, for
planning purposes; his control and loading
plan was issued on 11 December; and he is-
sued Operation Order 20-50 on 13 Decem-
ber. Doyle’s action report describes an
expeditious but well organized movement
of shipping in and out of Hungnam Har-
bor. Loading officers quickly developed an
ability to estimate loading capacities with-
out diagrams. The author’s casual assertion
not only is inaccurate but does a disser-
vice to those who did the job. One need
only read Doyle’s article “December
1950 at Hungnam,” in the April 1979
U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, to un-
derstand this.
The author then puzzles over why Chi-
nese forces did not put more pressure on
the Hungnam perimeter. He concludes it
was “as if a gentlemen’s agreement were
in force.” Major General O. P. Smith, CG
1st Marine Division, had a different
notion. In a 12 December letter to his wife
Esther (which can be found in his per-
sonal papers at the Marine Corps Univer-
sity Research Archives, Quantico), the
general observed that “six Chinese divi-
sions will not bother anyone for a while”;
the Marines, assisted by “old man winter,”
had already taken a terrible toll on their
attackers. Organic X Corps artillery was
used for close support. Doyle had used
two heavy cruisers, four to seven de-
stroyers, and three LSMRs (medium
landing ships equipped with rockets)
throughout (augmented on “Dog Day”
by the battleship Missouri) for naval gun-
fire support, area harassment fire, illumi-
nation, and deep support. Doyle also had
the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing at Yongpo
and Task Force 77 aircraft on call. From
9 to 24 December, 2,932 eight-inch
high-capacity, 14,491 five-inch proxim-
ity-fuzed, and 3,741 five-inch illuminat-
ing rounds were fired at Hungnam.
Weintraub also errs in his summary of
the outloading statistics for Hungnam,
which are among the most widely published
figures from the Korean War, asserting
that “550,000 estimated tons of bulk cargo”
were lifted. The actual figure was “350,000
measurement tons” (refer to the Opera-
tional Archives, Naval Historical Center).
The caption for a photograph of Mac-
Arthur and other officers on Mount Mc-
Kinley’s flag bridge on the morning of the
Inchon landing mislabels one of the
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officers as Vice Admiral Struble; it was
actually Rear Admiral Doyle. Struble was
aboard his own flagship, the cruiser Roches-
ter. According to protocol, MacArthur
should have been aboard Struble’s ship;
however, he elected to go with Doyle in-
stead. The irony is that Doyle and Struble
enjoyed a strong mutual antipathy.
It would have been useful to be able to refer
to Weintraub’s sources to trace the origins
of his errors, but unfortunately, he conde-
scends that “endnote numbers are eschewed
as intrusive, as are most footnotes.” He be-
lieves that “extensive back matter notes”
on each chapter’s sources would suffice.
(It is worth mentioning that the Marine
Corps Fleet Marine Force Manual 1-0,
Leading Marines—primarily intended for
young enlisted Marines—shows there as
FMFM 101.) It is impossible to ascertain
from his back-matter notes where specific
material originated, unless one compares
the text line by line with each source men-
tioned. I tried to do that for the dialog the
author offers for the famous 23 August 1950
“showdown” meeting regarding the Inchon
landing. Parts comport with published ac-
counts and participants’ recollections, but
some of it I have never seen before. Per-
haps it came from sources unnamed, but
without notes one cannot be certain.
Notes are not a luxury or, to use Weintraub’s
word, an “intrusion.” The author must
know that. Notes are at the heart of rigor-
ous scholarly research. Research is a so-
cial process, and its linchpin is the ability of
other scholars to check the validity of re-
ported findings. Ultimately, MacArthur’s
War contributes little to our understand-
ing of the Korean War. It is so fraught with
errors that it cannot be taken seriously.
It is a regrettable book.
DONALD CHISHOLM
Naval War College
Cable, James. The Political Influence of Naval Force
in History. New York: St. Martin’s, 1998. 213pp.
$59.95
Sir James Cable is a noted writer on naval
affairs. His Gunboat Diplomacy, 1919–1991
is a well regarded classic on the role of
naval force.
His latest work is a historical survey of
the political purposes for which gov-
ernments have made use of naval force.
Cable defines “naval force” as that “ex-
ercised by fighting ships manned by
disciplined sailors at the direction of a
central command responsible to the
political leadership.” His definition is
necessary to distinguish naval force as
we understand it today from the force
exercised by pirates, privateers, adven-
turers, and users of “landing craft”
(such as those that brought Roman sol-
diers to Britain in 55 A.D.) or galleys,
which served merely as conveyances to
bring soldiers together for seaborne
hand-to-hand combat.
Cable examines the extent to which naval
force furthered the political purposes of
the governments that used it—the scale
and nature of the force employed are not
otherwise considered relevant. He focuses
on examples of the use of force “for po-
litical purposes in which the naval element
is significant, the facts are reasonably well
established, and the degree of success or
failure and the durability of the result
are clear enough for useful conclusions
to be drawn.”
This definition thus largely excludes
consideration of fighting at sea before the
1500s, because standing navies were rare,
thus precluding the presence of disci-
plined officers and sailors. Portugal in
the sixteenth and the Netherlands in the
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